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Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
This article summarizes many of the U.S. Supreme
Court's criminal law decisions of the last term. Once
again the Court explored the relationship between the
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. The Court
also revisited the use of peremptory challenges based on
race. Special attention is given to these two topics
because of the continuing recent litigation in these areas.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The Court again considered the use of peremptory
challenges on a racial basis in Georgia v. McCollum, 112
S. Ct. 2348 (1992). The defendants were charged with
aggravated assault and battery. They were white, the
victims were African-American, and the prosecution
expected to show that race was a factor in the alleged
assaults. The prosecution moved pretrial for an order
prohibiting the defense from using its peremptory
challenges to exclude African-American jurors.
Early Cases
The Supreme Court had long held that racial discrimination in the jury selection process offended the Equal
Protection Clause. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880), decided soon after the adoption of the 14th
Amendment, the Court invalidated a state statute providing that only white men could serve as jurors. However, it
was not until 1965 in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), that the Court for the first time considered the use
of peremptory challenges as a device to exclude jurors
because of their race. The Court rejected Swain's challenge, but indicated that the systematic exclusion of
African-Americans through the use of peremptories over
a period of time might establish an Equal Protection violation. This burden, however, was difficult to satisfy.
Batson v. Kentucky
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court
jeparted from Swain by holding that a defendant could
:lstablish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
n the selection of the petit jury solely on the prosecutor's
3Xercise of peremptory challenges in that case. Estabishing systematic exclusion over a period of time, as
>uggested in Swain, was not required. Once the
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defendant makes a prima facie showing of the racial
basis for the peremptory strikes, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to offer a race-neutral explanation for the
strikes. The Court rested its decision on Equal Protection
grounds.
Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Requirement
In a subsequent decision, Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474 (1990), the defendant made a Sixth Amendment
challenge, based on the "fair cross section" guarantee of
the right to trial by jury. The Court ruled that the "fair
cross section'' requirement applied to the jury pool and
not to the petit jury chosen from that pool. Thus, peremptory challenges could not be attacked on Sixth Amendment grounds. Five Justices, however, suggested that an
Equal Protection challenge might be successful. Justice
Kennedy, writing a concurring opinion, indicated that he
would side with the four dissenting Justices if a Fourteenth Amendment challenge had been raised: "I find it
essential to make clear that if the claim here were based
on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause,
it would have merit." /d. at 488.
Standing
In Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991), a white defendant challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude black venirepersons from a jury in
an aggravated murder prosecution. The principal problem with the Equal Protection argument raised in Powers
concerned the issue of standing. Batson, a black man,
had challenged the exclusion of other blacks from the
jury. Powers, however, was a white defendant challenging the exclusion of black jurors. The issue turned on
whether a white defendant suffered any harm in this situation. The Court held that Powers had suffered harm:
The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole
that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in
accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The
verdict will not be accepted or understood in these
terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the
outset. Upon these considerations, we find that a
criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the
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prosecutor excludes jur()rS at his or her own trial Of!
account of race.ld. at 1372.
This analysis was also supported by a third-party standing argument, with the Court finally concluding "that a
defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party
equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because of their race." /d. at 1373.

Moreover, "neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the
attorney-client privilege gives a criminal defendant the
right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of ·
conduct." /d.
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
During the last term, the Supreme Court once again
considered the relationship between the hearsay rule
and the Confrontation Clause. The case was White v.
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), a child sexual abuse prosecution, in which the child's hearsay statements were
admitted in evidence. The trial court ruled the statements
.l3.dmil5~if:)l~ l11lc:l~r tw9 hearsa,y 13xgeptions: excited utterances and statements made for the purpose of medical
treatment. An understanding of White requires an
appreciation of the Court's earlier decisions.

Civil Cases
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 111
S.Ct. 2077 (1991), the Court extended Batson to civil litigation. This case is important because it suggested the
answer to another issue: Does Batson apply to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges? the principal issue
is whether there is state action when the defendant
strikes jurors on racial grounds, an issue also critical in
analyzing whether Batson applies to civil litigation. The
Court in Edmonson wrote:
Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may be
to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine representation on a
governmental body. Were it not for peremptory
challenges, there would be no question that the entire
process of determining who will serve on the jury
constitutes state action. The fact that the government
delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental character of
the power exercised. /d. at 2086.

Roberts v. Ohio: The Two-Pronged Test
In Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court identified two values underlying the Confrontation Clause: the
"Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation" and an
"underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process." /d. at 65. From these values, the Court
derived a two-pronged analysis that focused on (1) the
unavailability of the declarant and (2) the reliability of the
hearsay statement. The Court wrote:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause
normally requires a showing that[the declarant] is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly root~d hearsay exception.
In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trust.
.
worthiness. /d. at 66.
This summation of confrontation requirements immediately raised problems. Roberts involved the admissibility
of a preliminary hearing transcript as former testimony, a
hearsay exception that traditionally required a showing of
unavailability. Most hearsay exceptions, however, do not
require such a showing. Did the Court intend to impose
an unavailability requirement on every exception? As one
commentator noted, "Beneath [Roberts') apparently
orthodox disposition ... lies an interpretation of possibly
far-reaching significance." Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation
Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207, 224 (1984).

Defense Peremptory Challenges
In McCollum the Court ruled that the defense also
came within the Batson rule. Citing Edmonson, the Court
found that the defense use of peremptory challenges
amounted to "state action" within the meaning of the
14th Amendment. According to the Court, the jury fulfills
a "unique and constitutionally 1:;oll'lpeiiE)d governmental
function" and the peremptory challenge system could
not exist without significant governmental participation.
112 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court went on to note: "Regardless of who precipitated the jurors' removal, the perception and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court
has excused jurors based on race, an outcome that will
be attributed to the State." /d. at 2356.
Next, the Court ruled that the prosecution had standing
to raise the issue. While the Court acknowledged that
third-party standing is the exception rather than the rule,
it believed that third-party standing was appropriate in
this context. The State suffers injury "when the fairness
and integrity of its own judicial process is undermined."
/d. at 2357. In addition, excluded potential jurors face
formidable barriers in filing a civil rights suit to rectify
such discrimination.
Finally, the Court ruled that the defendant's rights were
not violated by this outcome. The Court observed that
"peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state- created
means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a
fair trial." /d. at 2358. The defendants also argued that
requiring the defense to explain its reasons for exercising
peremptory challenges, a real possibility under Batson,
would violate the right to counsel and the attorney-client
privilege. The Court rejected this argument, noting that
~he defense could state its reasons in camera if it
believed that its trial strategy would be revealed.

The Demise of the Two-Pronged Test
In 1986 the Court modified Roberts' two-pronged
approach, which required a showing of both reliability
and unavailability. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387
(1986), which involved the coconspirator exception to the
hearsay rule, appeared to limit Roberts' unavailability
requirement to cases in which former testimony is
introduced. The Court wrote:
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to
questions not presented in that case, but rather as a
resolution of the issue the Court said it was examining:
"the constitutional propriety of the introduction in
evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a
witness not produced at the defendant's subsequent
state criminal trial." /d. at 392-93 (quoting Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58 (1980)).
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The Court also wrote that Roberts should not be read "to
stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a
shewing that the declarant is unavailable." ld. at 394.
The Court reaffirmed this position in White: "Roberts
stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a
necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only
when the challenged out-of-court statements were made
in the course of a prior judicial proceeding." /d. at 741
(emphasis added). Thus, despite the language in
Roberts, a showing of unavailability is not always
demanded.

and both the Federal Rules of Evidence and nearly "fourfifths" of the states had adopted it. 112 S. Ct. at 742 n. 8.
In sum, the Court in determining reliability in both
cases simply looked to see how long a hearsay exception
had been recognized and how extensively it had been
adopted throughout the country.
Exceptions Not ''Firmly Rooted''
If a hearsay exception is not "firmly rooted," the Sixth
Amendment requires that "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" accompany the making of the hearsay
statement. This was the Court's holding in Idaho v.
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), which involved the admissibility of a child's statement under a residual hearsay
exception. This requirement involves a case-by-case
approach that considers the "totality of the circumstances" at the time the statement was made.
This approach, according to the Court, precludes
consideration of independent corroborating circumstances in determining reliability. "[T]he relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of
the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief." /d. at 3148. In rejecting reliance on
corroborating proof, the Court wrote:
[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" would permit admission of a presumptively
unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustvvorthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at
odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence
admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would
be of marginal utility. /d. at 3150.

Dispensing With the Unavailability Requirement
lnadi and White not only limit the unavailability requirement set forth in Roberts, they also establish blanket
rules dispensing with the requirement for at least some
hearsay exceptions- the coconspirator exception in
/nadi and the excited utterance and medical diagnosis
exceptions in White. The Court offered two reasons for
these rulings.
First, these exceptions differed from the former
testimony exception at issue in Roberts. Unlike former
testimony, coconspirator statements "provide evidence
of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated,
even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in
court." lnadi, 475 U.S. at 395. Similarly, the Court in White
noted that excited utterances and statements made for
the purpose of medical diagnosis had substantial probative value that "could not be duplicated simply by the
declarant later testifying in court." 112 S. Ct. at 743.
The second reason concerned what the Court
perceived to be an unnecessary burden on the prosecution. The prosecution subpoenas those witnesses that it
needs, and the same opportunity is guaranteed to the
defense under the Compulsory Process Clause. Thus,
an unavailability rule would operate only in those cases
where neither side wanted to call the witness. According
to the Court, this would "impose substantial additional
burdens on the factfinding process" because the prosecution would "be required to repeatedly locate and keep
continuously available each declarant." /d. at 742.

Conclusion
Despite the Court's statements in earlier cases, the
latest decisions suggest that the Confrontation Clause
does nothing more than "constitutionalize" the law of
hearsay. "Firmly rooted" exceptions are presumptively
reliable, and at this point the unavailability requirement
has been applied only to former testimony, which, under
traditional hearsay law, always required such a showing.

The Reliability Requirement
Decisions after Roberts also considered the second
(reliability) prong. Under this prong, a hearsay statement
satisfies confrontation requirements either because the
statement (1) falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or (2) possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Like lnadi, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987), considered a confrontation challenge to coconspirator statements, This time, however, the reliability
requirement was the focus of the litigation. Tracing the
judicial history of the coconspirator exception back over a
:::entury and a half, the Court found the exception "firmly
:mough rooted in our jurisprudence." /d. at 183, Accordngly, such statements automatically satisfy confrontation
jemands for reliability.
The Court adopted the same analysis in White, writing
hat there "can be no doubt" that the excited utterance
md medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions are "firmly
ooted." The Court noted that the excited utterance
!Xception had been recognized for "at least two centuries"

GRAND JURY PRACTICE
United States v. Williams, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (1992),
involved the prosecutor's failure to present exculpatory
evidence to a federal grand jury investigating false statements made to a federally insured bank as part of loan
applications. Williams alleged that the government had
chosen not to present evidence to the grand jury that
would have negated an intent to mislead the banks, an
essential element of the charged offense. Williams did
not argue that the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury
indictment required the prosecution to present exculpatory evidence. Rather, he based his argument on the federal courts supervisory power.
The Supreme Court ruled against Williams. The Court
pointed out that the grand jury has historically operated
independently of the courts: "[T]he whole theory of its
function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional
government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee
between the Government and the People." /d. at 1742.
Accordingly, the grand jury can investigate upon mere
suspicion, need not identify the offender it suspects, nor

3

is it required to indicate the precise charge it is investigating. The grand jury does not need prior judicial approval
to investigate or to indict. Judicial supervision occurs
only when the grand jury attempts to compel the appearance of witnesses or the production of evidence. In this
context, the courts will refuse to support the grand jury
only when a constitutional or common law privilege is
asserted by a witness. Given this history, the Court
refused to intrude into the process.
The Court also rested its decision on the limited function of a grand jury when deciding to indict. Historically,
the grand jury doE)S 11Qtd(3t~rmine guilt or innocence. It
evaluates only whether there is sufficient evidence to
proceed to trial, which requires only a consideration of
the prosecution's evidence. The defendant does not have
a right to testify nor a right to present evidence. Consequently, the prosecutor has no obligation to present such
evidence. The Court wrote: "If the grand jury has no obligation to consider all 'substantial exculpatory' evidence,
we do not understand how the prosecutor can be said to
have a binding obligation to present it." /d. at 1745.
SPEEDY TRIAL
The Court considered a Sixth Amendment speedy trial
claim in Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992).
In 19!30 Doggett was indicted for conspiring to import and
distribute cocaine. He left the country before he could be
arrested. The DEA agents in charge of the case subsequently learned that Doggett had been arrested on drug
charges in Panama. They requested Panamanian officials
to ''expel" Doggett to the u.s: Doggett, however, was
later released and traveled to Colombia, where he stayed
for-.several months. In September 1982 he re-entered the
United States and passed unhindered through U.S.
Customs in New York. He settled in Virginia, where he
married, earned a college degree, held a steady job,
lived openly under his own name, and stayed within the
law. In September 1988 the Marshall's Service ran a
routine credit check on severai thousand people subject
to outstanding warrants, a procedure that located
Doggett. He was subsequently arrested - 6 years after
he returned to tlie u:s. i:fnd 8 arid1f2 years after indictment. He moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial
grounds.
The Supreme Court agreedwithDoggett's claim and
reversed his conviction. An earlier case, Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972), set forth a four-pronged analysis for
determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy
trial has been violated:
[1]whether the delay before trial was uncommonly
long, [2]whether the government or the criminal
def~ndant is more to blame for that delay, [3] whether,
in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and [4] whether he suffered prejudice as
the delay's result. 112 S. Ct. at 2690.
The Court then proceeded to apply these factors. The
"extraordinary 81!2 years lag" clearly sufficed to trigger a
closer inquiry into the other factors. As for the second
factor, the record showed that for six years the government made no serious effort to find Doggett. Had they
done so, they would have located him "within minutes."
Moreover, there was no evidence that Doggett knew of
the indictment prior to his departure out of the country.
Indeed, his assertions of ignorance were supported by

other evidence in the record. Thus, the critical factor
turned on the fourth factor- whether Doggett had
suffered any prejudice.
Neither side could establish specific prejudice or lack
thereof. The Court, however, held that
excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or,
for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim
without regard to the other Barker criteria, ... it is part
of the mix of relevant tacts, and its importance
increases with the length of delay. /d. at 2693.
Had the prosecution pursued Doggett with due diligence,
his speedy trial claim would have failed. Had the prosecution intentionally held back to gain some impermissible advantage, Doggett's claim could easily be accepted;
official bad faith counts heavily against the prosecution.
Doggett's circumstances, however, fell someplace
between these two extremes. The Court believed that the
delay was simply too long and the negligence too great.
The Court observed: "The Government, indeed, can
hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in
concluding a criminal prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to justice;
the more weight the Government attaches to securing a
conviction, the harder it will try to get it." /d. at 2693-94.
-DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992), the
defendant was prosecuted for drug transactions that
occurred in Oklahoma, including a conspiracy count. At
a prior trial for drug transactions in Missouri, the Oklahoma
transactions had been admitted as "other acts" evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
Felix argued that the prosecution was foreclosed from
presenting evidence of the Oklahoma drug operation
because that evidence had been used in the prior
Missouri trial. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the evidentiary use of the Oklahoma
transactions at the Missouri trial was not the same as
prosecuting the defendant for those offenses, and thus
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the later prosecution for the Oklahoma transactions. Citing Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the Court recognized
a "basic, yet important, principle that the introduction of
relevant evidence of particular misconduct in a case is
not the same thing as prosecution for that conduct." /d.
at 1383.
Felix also argued that his conviction of the conspiracy
count violated the ban against double jeopardy. Of the
nine overt acts offered to support the conspiracy charge,
two were based on the conduct for which Felix had been
previously prosecuted in Missouri. He based his argument on Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution where
the Government, "to establish an essential element of an
offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." /d. at 521.
The Court bypassed the Grady rule by citing earlier
precedents, which it said had not been overruled by
Grady: "But long antedating any of these cases, and not
questioned in any of them, is the rule that a substantive
crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the

4

'same offense' for double jeopardy purposes." 112 S. Ct.
at 1384. For example, in Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640 (1946), the Court wrote that "the commission of
the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are
separate and distinct offenses ... [a]nd the plea of
double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both
offenses." /d. at 643. Similarly, in Garrett v. United States,
471 U.S. 773 (1985), the Court noted that "it does not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause ... to prosecute [a
continuing criminal enterprise] after a prior conviction for
one of the predicate offenses." /d. at 793. See also United
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
The Court went on to hold that these precedents
controlled rather than the Grady rule.

to impose the death penalty upon conviction. Thus, all
jurors were asked whether they would automatically vote
against the death penalty no matter what the facts of the
case were. The accused's question was the reversewhether the jurors would automatically impose the death
penalty.
On review, the Supreme Court found that the defendant had a right to have his question put to the jurors.
The Sixth Amendment does not require a jury determination concerning the death penalty. However, once a state
chooses to use juries in this context, due process
requires that the jury be impartial. Witherspoon and its
progeny recognize this principle. They hold that "a juror
who in no case would vote for capital punishment,
regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial
juror and must be removed for cause." 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
In Morgan the Court ruled that this analysis also
applied to jurors who held the opposite predilection:
A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
as the instructions will require him to do. Indeed,
because such a juror has already formed an opinion
on the merits, the presence or absence of either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely
irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the
requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective
juror who maintains such views. If even one such juror
is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the
State is disentitled to execute .the sentence. /d. at
2229-30.
This requirement necessarily means that the defendant
must be allowed to inquire about the individual juror's
views on this issue.
The Court also commented that Witherspoon had not
recognized any "right" on the part of the State. Rather, it
had limited the prosecution's power to exclude jurors who
had scruples concerning the death penalty. Only those
who would automatically vote against the death penalty
could be excluded for cause:
[A] State may not entrust the determination of whether
a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to
return a verdict of death. Specifically, we hold that a
sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that
imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding
veniremen for cause simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty or expressed
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520-23.

HEARSAY RULE
In United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992), the
Supreme Court interpreted Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), which
is similar to the Ohio rule. Two immunized witnesses
testified before a grand jury investigating racketeering.
They testified that neither they nor the defendants had
participated in the alleged racketeering scheme. When
the defense called these witnesses at trial, they asserted
their Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. The
defense then offered their grand jury testimony as former
testimony, arguing that the prosecution had had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the grand
jury proceedings. This opportunity, they argued, satisfied
the requirement of Rule 804(b)(1)- that the party against
whom the testimony is offered had a "similar motive" to
examine the hearsay declarant at the prior proceeding.
The district court ruled the evidence inadmissible
because the prosecution's motive in questioning a grand
jury witness in the investigatory stages of a case is far
different from its motive at trial. The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the prosecutor's motive when
examining the witness was not critical when the government obtains immunized testimony in a grand jury
proceeding from a witness who refuses to testify at trial.
According to the court, "adversarial fairness" required
this result.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts
had to apply the "similar motive" requirement as enacted
by Congress. The courts have no authority to disregard
the congressional language in order to achieve "adver:.arial fairness." The Supreme Court, howeve·r, did not
jecide the "similar motive" issue because the court of
3.ppeals had not considered that issue. Accordingly, the
:ourt remanded the case on this point. Justice Stevens,
jissenting, stated that the prosecution clearly had an
'opportunity and similar motive" to develop by direct or
~ross-examination the grand jury testimony.
TRIAL BY JURY: CAPITAL CASES
Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992), can be
lescribed as a "reverse Witherspoon" case. During the
roir dire of jurors in a capital case, the defense requested
he judge to inquire whether any of the jurors would autonatically impose the death penalty if the defendant was
:onvicted. The judge refused to ask the question. The
1rosecution's questions concerning the Witherspoon
equirements were permitted. Under Witherspoon v.
linois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), potential jurors may be
lisqualified for cause if they would refuse in all instances

COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992), involved
the burden of proof in cases in which a competency to
stand trial issue is raised. A California statute allocated
the burden to the defendant by a preponderance of
evidence.
The Supreme Court's prior cases clearly established
that due process precluded the trial of a criminal defendant who was incompetent. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). "[T]he
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test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding - and whether he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960).
After canvassing both the English and American
precedents, the Court could find "no settled tradition" on
the "burden of proof" issue. Moreover, contemporary
practice is also divided, with some states allocating the
burden tb the prosecution and some to the defense.
Given this background, the Court could not "say that the
allocation of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant
to prove incompetence 'offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 112 S. Ct. at2577
(citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
Accordingly, the Court ruled against Medina. The
Court wrote:
Once a State provides a defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation, however,
we perpeive no basis for holding that due process
further requires the State to assume the burden of
vindicating the defendant's constitutional right by
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant is
competent to stand trial. /d. at 2579.

Had Jacobson promptly availed himself of the first offer
to order child pornography, "it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury instruction."
/d. at 1541. Such was not the case, however. He was the
target of 26 months of repeated mailings and communications from federal agents. He became predisposed
because of the Government's own conduct. Thus, the
Court ruled as a matter of law that Jacobson had been
entrapped.
INSANITY ACQUITTEE
_foucll? v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992}, involved a
state statute that continued the commitment of insanity
acquittees. Under Louisiana law, a defendant found not
guilty by reasons of insanity (NGRI) is committed to a
psychiatric hospital until he proves that he is not dangerous. Under this scheme, an acquittee can be detained,
even if he does not suffer from any mental illness. Foucha
challenged this procedure as a violation of due process.
The Supreme Court struck down the Louisiana law.
The superintendent of the hospital recommended
Foucha's release because the hospital doctors had found
no evidence of mental illness since Foucha's admission
approximately four years earlier. A judge then appointed
a two-member sanity commission to examine Foucha.
These doctors found no present mental illness, but they
cautioned that Foucha suffered from an antisocial
personality, a condition that is not a mental disease.
Therefore, they would not certify that Foucha was no
longer dangerous.
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme
Court had ruled that a person committed to a mental
institution in a civil proceeding must be shown to be
dangerous by clear and convincing evidence. The Court,
however, did not apply the same rule when a defendant is
acquitted in a criminal trial by reason of insanity. Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). Under Jones, the
State need not satisfy the Addington burden in this
context. In the Court's view, the NGRI verdict established
that the defendant was mentally ill and still dangerous. In
Jones, however, the Court also stated that "[t]he committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous." 112 S. Ct. at
1784. This aspect of Jones was based on O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which the Court had
held as a matter of due process that it was unconstitutional for the State to continue to confine a mentally ill
person who is not dangerous.
Louisiana did not contend that Foucha was mentally ill
at the time of the hearing, only that he was dangerous.
Thus, according to the Court, "the basis for holding
Foucha in a psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee
has disappeared, and the State is no longer entitled to
hold him on that basis." 112 S. Ct. at 1784. Moreover, the
Court ruled that confinement based on his antisocial
personality violated due process.
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Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992),
raised an entrapment issue. Jacobson was convicted of
receiving child pornography through the mails. In 1984
Jacobson ordered two magazines, entitled Bare Boys I
andBareBoys II, from a California bookstore. At that time
receipt of these magazines was legal under both federal
and state law. Postal inspectorslaterJoundhis name on
the mailing list for this bookstore. For the next 2 and 112
years two government agencies (the postal Service and
the Customs Service) made repeated efforts, through
five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal, to
ascertain Jacobson's willingness to break a new federal
law by ordering sexually explicit photographs of children
through the mail. These agencies finally piqued Jacobson's interest, and he ordered a magazine. When he
received the magazine, he was arrested and his house
searched. The search disclosed only the Bare Boys
magazines and the material sent by ttie federal agencies.
At trial Jacobson asserted the entrapment defense, a
clairn with which the Supreme Court agreed. The federal
rule on entrapment (and the majority rule) is known as
the origin-of-intent test. A defendant must establish (1}
that the criminal design originated with the police and (2}
that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the
crime. The Court explained:
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in
an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime
so that the Government may prosecute.... Where the
Government has induced an individual to break the
law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as it was
in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached
by Government agents. 112 S. Ct. at 1540.

ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION AT TRIAL
David Riggins was charged with murder and robbery.
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992). After his arrest,
a psychiatrist began treatment with thrioridazine, an
antipsychotic drug. The dosage was raised when Riggins
continued to "hear voices" and experience sleep problems.
Because the defense intended to rely on an insanity
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defense, it moved to suspend the medication until after
trial, contending that Riggins had a right to show the jury
his true mental state. The trial court refused, and Riggins
was forced to receive the medication during trial.
The Supreme Court ruled in Riggins favor. In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Court had ruled
that due process permits a mentally ill prison inmate to
be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs where
there is a determination that "the inmate is dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's
medical interest." /d. at 227. The Court, however, recognized that an inmate's interest in avoiding involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs raised due process
issues. Thus, once Riggins moved to terminate treatment, the State became obligated to establish the need
for the drug's continued use.
The prosecution might have prevailed had it shown
that the medication was required to protect Riggins or
others, or to ensure that he was competent to stand trial.
The trial court, however, had made no findings about the
need for the drug or the availability of reasonable alternatives. Moreover, the record did show that the medication
may have hampered Riggins' defense. The side effects
could make him "uptight," drowsy, or confused. "It is
clearly possible that such side effects impacted not just
Riggins' outward appearance, but also the content of his
testimony on direct or cross-examination, his ability to
follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel." !d. at 1816. Thus, there existed a
strong possibility that Riggins' defense was impaired due
to the administration of the drug. The Court noted:
Because the record contains no finding that might
support a conclusion that administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an
essential state policy, ... we have no basis for saying
that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this
case was justified. /d. at 1817.
Significantly, the Court also noted what was not decided.
Riggins never argued that he had a right to be tried without

the medication if its discontinuation would render him
incompetent to stand trial. The Court observed: "The
question whether a competent criminal defendant may
refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at trial is not before
us." /d. at 1815.

EXTRADICTION
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992), concerned the abduction of a Mexican national in
Mexico and his repatriation to the United States for trial.
He was indicted for participating in the murder of a DEA
agent in Mexico. DEA officials were responsible for his
abduction, although they were not personally involved in
it. The defendant moved to dismiss the prosecution,
arguing that his abduction violated an extradition treaty
between Mexico and the United States.
Several early precedents touched upon this issue. In
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), the Court had ruled
that the abduction of Ker from Peru did not preclude his
trial in the United States. The Ker rule later was applied in
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), in which a defendant was kidnaped in Chicago by Michigan officers and
brought to trial in Michigan. The Court wrote: "There is
nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit
a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will." /d. at 522.
In the Court's view the Ker-Frisbie line of cases
contmlled unless the extradiction treaty between the
United States and Mexico prohibited abductions. Nothing in the Treaty required either nation to refrain from
forcible abduction, nor is extradiction specified as the
only method of proceeding. The Court refused to infer a
prohibition against abduction. Even if the abduction is
"shocking" and a violation of international law, it is not
prohibited by the Treaty and thus is a matter for the
Executive Branch.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, referred to the majority
position as "monstrous."
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